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ABSTRACT

This report presents the problem of school practice and moral socialization in an attempt to transform the issues into a problem for research. Three divisions of study are presented: 1) a rationale for the examination of schooling and moral development, 2) the development of procedures for analyzing the use of explanations, and 3) speculation on the basis of pilot test results about the direction that future research might take. The rationale for the study presents a review of two perspectives in socialization literature. The sociological perspective addresses the manner in which social mechanisms impress themselves on individuals as a means of perpetuating the social order. The psychological perspective concerns the manner in which children incorporate their social environment. An adequate study of the influence of the school on the moral developments of the child is also presented. Procedures developed included a modification of the Kohlberg free-response interview paralleling a technique developed and used by Rest (1969) and a modification of the school-specific "Clarke Barto Incident," developed by Nordstrom and Friedenberg. Data were collected for the purpose of instrument development, not to demonstrate anything about the schools. The final section illustrates the character of the speculation and indicates future areas of study. A 22-item bibliography and appendixes of procedural material are included. (MJM)

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THE MORAL EXPLANATIONS OF TEACHERS, THE MORAL DEVELOPMENT OF STUDENTS

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> Each teacher shall endeavor to impress upon the minds of the pupils the principles of morality, truth, justice, patriotism, and a true comprehension of the rights, duties, and dignity of American citizenship, including kindness toward domestic pets and the humane treatment of living creatures, to teach them to avoid idleness, profanity, and falsehood, and to instruct them in manners and morals and the principles of a free government.
>
> --California Education Code, Section 13556.5*

Schools are expected to foster the moral development of their students. Whether fostering moral development means teaching children something in particular or teaching them nothing in particular depends on one's political ideology. In either case schools are held responsible for their effect on children's morality, and the law frequently makes that responsibility explicit. Even where it does not, no teacher could believe himself free of responsibility for the moral impact of his dealings with his students.

We know very little about how schools affect the moral development of students. There are various reasons for this neglect by researchers, but the remedy requires at least that we start to think about the possible links between school practice and moral socialization. We report here on our own progress in transforming this tangle of issues into a problem for research.

We begin with a rationale for the examination of schooling and moral development, we discuss the development of procedures for analyzing the use of explanations, and we speculate on the basis of

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*Added to the Code by statute in 1968.

pilot test results about the direction that future research might take. We invite company in our speculation and critical comment on our approach.

SCHOOLING AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT

There are two bodies of socialization literature bearing on the influence of schools on children's moral development. One, promulgated primarily by sociologists, addresses the manner in which social mechanisms impress themselves on individuals as a means of perpetuating the social order. The other, promulgated by psychologists, addresses the manner in which children incorporate their social environment. An adequate study of the influence of schools on the moral development of children requires linking the concerns of the two approaches, since neither by itself can tell the whole tale.

From a sociological perspective, one body of literature treats institutional culture and the impress it leaves on the lives of institutional clients. Dreeben's analysis of "what is learned in school" proposes in general terms what the socializing function of school structure might be (1968). Becker's work on the maladaptive socialization of medical students considers the effect of institutional culture on values (1961). Jackson's studies of routine in elementary school classrooms document the character of classroom interaction ritual (1967;1968). Goffman's analysis of mental hospitals and other total institutions stresses their potency in controlling behavior and changing values (1961). But none of these studies links institutional characteristics to the powerful indicators of enduring psychological effect that can be derived from developmental theory.

Several investigators have studied moral development from the perspective of psychology. Hartshorne and May's Character Education Inquiry in the 1920's studied children's moral character, conceived as

a set of virtues including honesty, service, and self-control (Hartshorne and May, 1928-30). They hypothesized that "if honesty was a unified character trait, and if all children either have it or do not have it, then we would expect to find children who are honest in one situation to be honest in all other situations and, vice versa, to find dishonest children to be deceptive in all situations" (Hartshorne, 1932, p. 209). On the contrary, they found that children's behavior was determined more by the circumstances of the situation than by any construct called honesty. Further, they found no significant relationship between children's knowledge of moral behavior and their likelihood of not cheating (Ibid., p. 213). Despite Hartshorne and May's findings, most American investigators of children's morality continued to use a "bag of virtues" concept of morality and attempted to correlate moral behavior with religious training, membership in the Boy Scouts, and similar variables (Voelker, 1921; Fairchild, 1931).

Piaget's work, by contrast, clearly focused on the moral judgment of children, not on their moral behavior (Piaget, 1948). Piaget reports that the young child views rules as having always existed and therefore as immutable. The moral realism of the young child defines obedience to any rule or adult command as good, and insists that the letter and not the spirit of the law be observed. Therefore the young child says that breaking fifteen cups by accident is a more serious offense than breaking one cup "on purpose" (Ibid., 1948). At a chronological age of eight or nine, however, children begin to submit rules to critical examination in light of the intention of the actor in a given situation, and to feel that accidents should not be punished.

Adopting the approach of Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg has studied children's moral explanation using a cognitive-developmental theory to distinguish six hierarchical stages of moral judgment. The stages of moral development and their bases in levels of moral judgment are summarized in Table 1 (Kohlberg, 1967).

Insert Table 1 about here

Kohlberg's six stages form an invariant sequence in which the attainment of an advanced stage is dependent upon the attainment of each preceeding stage. Each stage is cognitively different from the preceeding stage, taking into account the previous stages but reorganizing the content of those stages into a new cognitive structure. The six stages were defined by free responses to ten dilemma stories in which respondents were asked to resolve a dilemma confronting the main character. The respondents' justifications were then scored. The definition of stages is not dependent on responses to a particular set of materials. The scoring procedures by stages can be applied to any moral judgment unit or sentence in any context as, for example, was done to a selection of testimony by Adolf Eichman (Kohlberg, 1967).

Turiel (1966) tested and confirmed Kohlberg's contention that movement from one moral stage should be to the stage directly above the subject's stage rather than to any other stage. Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg (1969) extended Turiel's findings. They found that subjects were most likely to understand and prefer moral justifications one stage above their own level, and to reject moral justifications

below their own level. Justifications more than one stage above their own were likely to be eschewed or, if selected by the subject, to be construed as representing a lower level (Turiel, 1969).

There is a small literature concerning institutional effects on the development of moral judgment. Several investigators, using Piaget's dilemma stories, have found evidence of these effects. Minuchin et al. (1969), in their study of the psychological impact of the environments of four elementary schools, report that children in schools they designate modern display more advanced moral development on the Piaget instrument than do children in schools they designate traditional.

Other studies report regression in level of moral judgment as a result of extended residence in a school for mentally retarded girls (Abel, 1941) and in reform schools and jails (Kohlberg, 1969). Kramer (1968), using the Kohlberg dilemma stories, finds that students at liberal arts colleges occasionally regress, and attributes the regression to their having moved away from home to the college setting. He implies that they have not lost their capacity to understand more sophisticated moral reasoning, but that features of the college environment have prompted them to use lower level moral justifications temporarily. In each of these studies the regressive effects on moral development are related to the character of the institutional setting, and in every case the institutions are residential and thus have possibilities for exerting continuous influence on moral development. These studies--useful because they suggest that we can, in fact, detect the effects of institutional treatment on moral development--.

are inadequate as explanations of moral socialization because they do not attempt to identify the features of institutions which affect moral development.

We do not expect public schools or other day schools to be as effective as residential institutions in fostering either progression or regression. What we do expect to find is evidence that schools impose a moral environment distinct from that of the rest of the student's experience. As moral socialization, that will be effect enough. For one of the things that children learn in school may be precisely that schools--and perhaps that public institutions--either must or do lie outside the province of common morality.*

Studying moral explanation promises a Janus-like perspective on the moral environment of the school. At the center of our problem is the character of the explanations that teachers and administrators offer students and of the explanations that they in turn accept from students. On one side of this center, we want to investigate the extent to which the explanations a student commonly gives and receives in school match, lead, or trail his stage of moral development. Based on the work of Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg (1969) we can make predictions about a student's preference for certain sorts of explanation and about

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*Kohlberg himself concludes that schools frequently confuse administrative convenience with moral notions of right and wrong, and that school people often fail as moral educators because they operate with lower levels of moral justifications than their students can understand and accept (Kohlberg, 1971).

the effects of explanations on his development, if we know the sort of explanation he most commonly offers.

On the other side of the center, we want to know what sort of explanation a teacher or administrator offers students, and whether he offers those explanations because he is a school person. It seems plausible, for example, that a teacher might offer different sorts of explanations in a school context than he would elsewhere, and that this discrepancy might be attributable in part to the fact that his decisions about how to treat students are made within the social constraints of the school. Obtaining evidence pertinent to this knot of concerns obviously depends on our being able to record and evaluate the justifications employed by teachers and students. We are now developing instruments to do that job.

THE PROCESS OF INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT

The instrument we are developing now is a modification of the interview schedule which Kohlberg developed and used in his studies of moral development. Kohlberg's schedule consists of ten dilemma stories which are read to the respondent who is then asked to resolve the dilemma and to present justifications for his resolution.* Although the original Kohlberg instrument elicits a rich display of moral justification for coding and analysis, it seems to us to have drawbacks for the kind of study we want to undertake. While it has been administered as a paper-and-pencil test in which the subject writes his responses, it is most effectively and most frequently administered in an interview format whose success depends largely upon the skill of the interviewer in probing for scorable justifications. The resulting tape recording must be transcribed, a time-consuming and therefore costly process. The transcript must then be coded and scored by someone trained in the art of Kohlberg scoring. Assuming that we would need a substantial number of subjects and that interview time in schools would be limited, we came to believe that a shortened procedure, requiring less artful administration, would serve our purposes better.

We also hoped to eliminate the expense of transcription and to work out a means of pre-coding alternative justifications

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*A subject might be asked to respond to only four or five of the ten dilemma stories in an interview. An explication of one of the dilemma stories is given in Kohlberg (1969, pp. 379-382).

according to Kohlberg's stages so that we could begin to ask subjects to respond from points of view other than their own. Our aim was to devise a multiple-choice, paper-and-pencil instrument. We have not yet accomplished that, but we have taken a step in that direction by developing a Q-sort routine for which we hold out hope. Recently we have been pilot testing the Q-sort in the course of a Kohlberg free-response interview. We report here on developing and piloting the instrument for those who may be interested.

Our modification of the Kohlberg interview parallels a technique developed and used by Rest (1969). In addition to probing for justifications for a subject's resolution of a dilemma as Kohlberg does, Rest offers the subject pieces of advice representing all the relevant aspects at all six stages of moral judgment for both possible resolutions to the dilemma. He then asks the subject to discuss each statement (as a measure of comprehension), and to rank his preference for each statement on a 1 to 5 scale. Finally the subject is asked to rank a subset of six statements--one from each stage, but all representing one aspect--in order of preference. Thus since there are five aspects for Situation III, the Heinz case, Rest uses sixty statements per subject.

We likewise present the subject with one of the Kohlberg dilemmas and then ask him to tell us what the perplexed character should do. We then present the subject with six cards on which are written six "pieces of advice" that we ask him to suppose the character has received from friends or colleagues. We ask him to rank the cards from best to worst by sorting them first into three piles by picking out

the two best and the two worst pieces of advice, and then by distinguishing the better piece of advice from the worse in each pile.

For each of the two horns of any dilemma we have written a piece of advice using an argument characteristic of each of the six stages. Where Rest had distinguished same-stage arguments according to the aspect of morality they addressed, we freely combined arguments appealing to, say, consequences, intention and motive--three distinguishable aspects according to Rest's procedure. The combination appeared natural enough when read, and we expected to ask a subject during pilot testing on what basis he had ranked the arguments. At the time of pilot testing we used two of the Kohlberg dilemmas, numbers III and IV from the original set. In devising arguments for the first of the two dilemmas we deliberately tried to provide relatively brief justifications using comparable aspects across all the arguments in a set. For the other we paid little attention to brevity and none to providing comparable aspects.

We also wanted to see whether we could devise a school-specific situation. For the pilot test, we used a modified version of the "Clarke-Barto Incident" devised by Nordstrom and Friedenberg for the study they report in Society's Children (1967). Although the incident does not pose a moral dilemma, it does suggest a situation peculiar to schools and one in which the characters might plausibly attempt to justify themselves. Justification seemed most plausible here in the mouth of the teacher. We provided Arthur Clarke with five different justifications, each keyed to one of the Kohlberg levels from one to five. Since it seemed to be stretching things too far to propose a

justification for taking Johnny to the principal that rested on universal moral principles, we eliminated our attempt at a stage VI justification. The appendix contains a copy of the three situations and their associated alternative justifications.

We included finally a sixth alternative for Arthur Clarke which read: "I'm going to have to take you in, John. It's not the fact that you're smoking. It's the principle of the thing." This cryptic statement we asked the subjects to explicate for us by ranking a set of six one-sentence "principles" according to their sense of what Arthur Clarke most likely had in mind. These cards read:

> You're making me do a job that I've been assigned to, but that I don't like.
>
> You're corrupting other kids by your example.
>
> You're endangering your own health.
>
> You're defying my authority as a teacher.
>
> You're breaking a school rule.
>
> You're messing up the washroom.

Granted, this item constituted a fishing expedition, but the results have been useful to us in exploring oddities of response on the previous item.

For pilot testing, the interview format was roughly this: The interviewer explained the procedure to the subject, then asked him to read and resolve the first dilemma ("Should Heinz steal the drug or not?"). What followed was a series of questions requiring the subject to specify under what conditions the act of stealing might be considered right. In addition to these questions, some interviews employed repeated requests for justification. The second sort of interview

technique, which we have labelled "probing," is like the technique usually used in the Kohlberg interviews. The other, which we have called "non-probing," approximates an effect we could achieve with a paper-and-pencil instrument.

After the questioning, the subject was asked to rank the six justifications for the resolution he preferred. When he had finished we asked him why he ranked the cards as he had, and then asked him to rank them again according to his sense of how appropriate each would be to offer to a class of students (if the subject was a teacher) or to a teacher (if he was a student). No subject changed the order of more than one pair of cards, and most said they would offer students or teachers the same sort of explanation that they originally ranked best. We followed the same procedure for the second Kohlberg dilemma. For the Clarke-Barto Incident, we asked teachers what Clarke should say to Johnny and students what Clarke most likely would say to Johnny. Then we asked them to rank the five explanations according to those same criteria. Instructions for the list of "principles" we have already explained.

Our primary purpose in pilot testing was to de-bug our instrument and then to see whether we could devise a way to assign a Kohlberg stage score to a subject on the basis of his ranking of alternative justifications. Assigning the stage score requires cross-validation of our scoring procedure with the scores assigned by trained scorers to transcripts of interviews with our subjects. Since this cross-validation is not complete, we cannot yet report on the effectiveness of our procedures as a whole.

Our rationale for trying to substitute a ranking procedure for free-response interviews derives from the work of Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg (1969). They have found that people tend to understand but reject explanations below their modal stage, to accept explanations at and above their modal stage, to prefer explanations above their modal stage, but not to understand explanations more than one stage above their own. We would expect on these grounds alone, then, that subjects presented with explanations for moral choice at all six levels would rank most highly an explanation above their own stage, reject most strongly an explanation below their own stage, and would place explanations they most frequently use between the extremes. Where the test of agreement persuades us that the rankings a subject has provided are not spurious, we have the sense that subjects do rank the cards roughly as that formulation proposes. First, however we have tried to discover the sources of spurious rankings.

We have assumed that, if subjects are attending to pertinent aspects of the cards they are sorting, the rankings on the two Kohlberg dilemmas ought to be very much alike. The most useful test so far of the ranking procedure has been the degree to which a subject's ranking on one Kohlberg dilemma agrees with his ranking on another Kohlberg dilemma. The comparison has also been handy for detecting bugs in the instrument.

Insert Table 2 about here

Table 2 reports the degree of agreement on the Kohlberg dilemmas for eleven of our thirteen subjects. Of the two remaining subjects, both students, one did not get to the second of the dilemmas because she had trouble reading the explanations. Thus, the first constraint of using an instrument of this form: the reading ability of our subjects. Our subjects, teachers and high school juniors and seniors from a suburban school, probably are better than average readers taken together. Nonetheless, some spurious ranking was no doubt due to the fact that the cards have to be read. The other subject omitted from the sample could not respond to the first dilemma with much circumspection. When asked why stealing was wrong, he explained that his father beat him when he stole. It became obvious during the interview that the two dilemmas were not comparable tests of his moral development.

The fact that the rankings of each subject are characterized in Table 2 by two correlation coefficients reflects our discovery that the Stage 2 cards for our first dilemma are faulty. Kramer (1968) and others have noted that arguments at Stage 2 can easily be mistaken for those at Stage 5. Among subjects who understand or use Stage 5 reasoning, the confusion is frequent; it is unlikely, however, among subjects who do not understand Stage 5. We found many otherwise sophisticated subjects ranking the Stage 2 explanation immediately after the Stage 5, though none did the reverse--that is, ranked 2-5. Our examination of the Stage 2 cards in the first dilemma confirms that they contain no statement clearly inappropriate for Stage 5, whereas the Stage 2 cards for the second dilemma do contain such statements. As a check,

we eliminated Stage 2 responses from the rankings and computed a new Spearman coefficient for each subject. The agreement of the rankings, disregarding responses to Stage 2 alternatives, appears as "r_s corrected." We are generally happy with the degree of agreement that these scores reflect, though some inconsistency remains.

Table 2 suggests additional explanations for some of that inconsistency. One seems to be the style of interview. Students whose resolutions were probed for justifications were more consistent than students whose choices were not probed. It may be that subjects who expose their own reasoning to the interviewer attend better to the procedure of ranking the explanations that we provided. If we want consistent response, we may not be able to dispense with probing and, hence, with the interview format.

Teachers are somewhat more consistent than students, no matter what the interview style. The relative inconsistency of students comes as no surprise, however, and may be attributable to the stage mixture phenomenon which has been discussed extensively elsewhere (Turiel, 1969, Kohlberg, 1969). In brief, stage mixture varies depending upon whether a subject is introducing a new stage to his repertoire. Middle adolescents, particularly those who are just beginning to use post-conventional explanations, display a great deal of stage mixture, which is to say that they would appear relatively inconsistent. Adults become quite stable in their pattern of stage usage, and would be expected to appear relatively consistent. But among students who were probed, the level of inconsistency is not very upsetting, despite the possibility of stage mixture. We feel encouraged by these results to proceed to develop a scheme for assigning stage scores.

THE STRANGE MORAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE SCHOOL

What is life?
Why have kids?
What is fun?
What is gruel?
What is morality? It's not school!

---from a library carrel

We collected data for the purpose of instrument development, not to demonstrate anything about the schools. At this point, we cannot demonstrate that peculiarities in our data are not due to faults in the instrument. Nonetheless, our data suggest directions in which our study might go, and we present them to illustrate the character of our speculation.

We wanted to know whether the rankings our subjects offered on the Clarke-Barto justifications agreed as well with one of the Kohlberg dilemma rankings as the two rankings agreed with each other. As it turned out, they did not. Table 3, which presents the agreement between the Clarke-Barto rankings and the rankings on the second Kohlberg dilemma, shows no tendency for the two sets of rankings either to agree

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(Table 3 about here)

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or disagree. Assuming that the Clarke-Barto alternatives are comparable stage for stage with those of the moral dilemmas, we may be observing a shift in the way teachers prefer to explain their action when they have to justify enforcing school policy.

When one considers the teachers one by one in the light of their teaching experience he comes to wonder what they have learned in school. Teacher 1, for example, whose rankings on the two moral dilemmas agreed strongly, has ranked the alternative explanations for enforcing a school rule in some unrelated way. Like all the other teachers, he did not think that he would make special allowances in offering moral explanations to students. And like the other teachers in our sample, he knows the ropes. He has taught for 22 years, the last 13 in this school. Of the teachers represented in Table 3, all but Teacher 5 have taught for more than 10 years. And Teacher 5 alone, who has about half the average teaching experience of the others, ranks the school-related explanations in clear agreement with his ranking of the moral dilemmas. It may be that after some time working in schools, teachers learn that the appropriate standards for justifying their enforcement of policy differ from their standards of moral justification.

If teachers are socialized over time to standards of justification that pertain especially to dealings with students in schools, we would expect experienced teachers' rankings of the Clarke-Barto alternatives to agree with one another. To help satisfy our curiosity about this, we have averaged the ranks assigned each card, computed standard deviations, and assigned a "consensus rank" to indicate the order of preference for each card among teachers and among students.

(Table 4 about here)

Among teachers (and among students) greatest agreement between subjects occurs at the extremes. Teachers seem to group closely, but to check we do indeed need more subjects.

Teachers reject most clearly what we have called the Stage 3 explanation. Perhaps distaste for arguments at the developmental stage represented by this card is a less important reason for its rejection by teachers than that it simply represents bad tactics. The Stage 3 alternative is the only one which implicates the teacher's personal disapproval in censuring a student. The other cards either distinguish scrupulously between the teacher's personal view and the enforcement of the rule (Stages 1 and 2), or offer an entirely impersonal explanation (Stages 4 and 5). Given the description of Johnny as a 16-year-old troublemaker, teachers may feel that expressing personal disapproval would induce a sneer faster than shame. Among the rest of the explanations, teachers prefer arguments of greater moral sophistication.

What students say they would expect from a teacher is a somewhat different story. As a group the students sense that teachers prefer authority-maintaining explanations. To them the Stage 1 explanation seems as likely an offering as the Stage 4. The Stage 5 card, which averaged almost as high a rank among students as the Stages 1 and 4, was however the subject of considerable disagreement. Two students commented that it was most implausible simply on the grounds that a teacher would never suggest to a student that he leave school. Other students regarded the Stage 5 alternative as the most teacherly of all.

The card we have called Stage 1 is the most anomalously ranked alternative of the lot. Teachers don't much like it. It is, after all, a cop-out. ("I don't make the rules around here, I just enforce them.") But among students, this deference to the authority of school policy is just what seems most like a teacher. At present, it seems that students see the enforcement of administrative policy as a context in which their anticipation that teachers will evidence moral sophistication may rightly be set aside. Rightly, we say, because we see no evidence that students disdain the moral understanding of their teachers. We will want to know whether students expect the same from teachers when a student's welfare seems to be truly at stake. If not, we will want to know in what contexts students expect the ordinary use of moral justification to become applicable -- that is, the point at which a student's welfare is truly at stake. But if administrative policy always displaces normal moral justification, even if for only some students, we will want to know whether there aren't other related social domains in which common moral justification may rightly be set aside.

TABLE 1

CLASSIFICATION OF MORAL JUDGMENT INTO LEVELS AND STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT

Levels	Basis of Moral Judgment	Stages of Development
I	Moral value resides in external, quasi-physical happenings, in bad acts, or in quasi-physical needs rather than in persons and standards.	Stage 1: Obedience and punishment orientation. Egocentric deference to superior power or prestige, or a trouble-avoiding set. Objective responsibility.
		Stage 2: Naively egoistic orientation. Right action is that instrumentally satisfying the self's needs and occasionally others'. Awareness of relativism of value to each actor's needs and perspective. Naive egalitarianism and orientation to exchange and reciprocity.
II	Moral value resides in performing good or right roles, in maintaining the conventional order and the expectancies of others.	Stage 3: Good-boy orientation. Orientation to approval and to pleasing and helping others. Conformity to stereotypical images of majority or natural role behavior, and judgment by intentions.
		Stage 4: Authority and social-order maintaining orientation. Orientation to "doing duty" and to showing respect for authority and maintaining the given social order for its own sake. Regard for earned expectations of others.
III	Moral value resides in conformity by the self to shared or shareable standards, rights, or duties.	Stage 5: Contractual legalistic orientation. Recognition of an arbitrary element or starting point in rules or expectations for the sake of agreement. Duty defined in terms of contract, general avoidance of violation of the will or rights of others, and majority will and welfare.
		Stage 6: Conscience or principle orientation. Orientation not only to actually ordained social rules but to principles of choice involving appeal to logical universality and consistency. Orientation to conscience as a directing agent and to mutual respect and trust.

Source: Kohlberg, 1967, p. 171.

TABLE 2

AGREEMENT BETWEEN RANKINGS OF ADVICE ON
KOHLBERG DILEMMAS III AND IV

Subject	Interview Style: Probing r_s	Probing r_s corrected	Non-probing r_s	Non-probing r_s corrected
Teachers				
1			.83	1.00
2			.83	1.00
3			.37	.50
4	.94	.90		
5	.60	.90		
Students				
1			.60	.50
2			.60	.45
3			.09	.00
4	.43	1.00		
5	.77	.90		
6	.54	.70		

TABLE 3

AGREEMENT BETWEEN RANKINGS ON KOHLBERG DILEMMA IV
AND CLARKE-BARTO INCIDENT

Subject	Interview Style	
	Probing r_s	Non-probing r_s
Teachers		
1		.00
3		-.30
4	.50	
5	.70	
Students		
1		-.80
2		.10
3		.70
4	.80	
5	-.60	
6	.10	

TABLE 4

RANKINGS OF ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR NOT SMOKING IN THE SCHOOL WASHROOM (CLARKE-BARTO INCIDENT)

Stage of Explanation	Teachers (N=4) ("Teacher should say?") Mean rank	s.d.	Consensus rank	Students (N=7) ("Teacher would say?") Mean rank	s.d.	Consensus rank
I	3.5	1.3	4	2.3	1.0	1 (tie)
II	2.8	1.3	3	4.1	0.7	5
III	4.8	0.5	5	3.6	1.6	4
IV	2.5	1.0	2	2.3	1.1	1 (tie)
V	1.5	1.0	1	2.6	1.8	3

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APPENDIX

SITUATION III

In Europe, a woman was near death from cancer. One drug might save her, a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The druggist was charging $2000, ten times what the drug cost him to make. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or to let him pay later. The druggist said, "No." So the husband began to feel desperate and thought of breaking into the man's store to steal the drug. But since he found the question of whether or not to steal the drug a difficult one, he went back to his friends for advice on what to do.

1. PRO: It's all right for you to take the drug. Remember, the drug isn't really worth $2000. It wouldn't be such a crime to take it. And surely your wife's life is worth more than $2000. But if you let your wife die, think what might happen. They might invesigate you for her death, and then you'd be in a real bind.

1. CON: You shouldn't steal such an expensive drug. It would be a serious crime. And consider also how much damage you might do to the druggist's store and to his laboratory apparatus if you tried to break in and search for the drug. The equipment alone must be worth a small fortune.

2. PRO: You should take the drug. After all, it's not that you actually want to steal. It's that the drug is the only way you have of saving your wife's life. She really needs the medicine and the druggist doesn't. You're not really hurting him by taking it. And even if you happen to get arrested, it would be worth it. The judge would probably let you off with a light sentence and your wife would be alive.

2. CON: You shouldn't try to steal the drug. After all, the druggist supports himself by selling what he makes. That's how he makes his living. He has to live, too, you know. And then suppose you're caught. You'd be in no position to help your wife if they put you behind bars. Don't risk it.

3. PRO: It wouldn't be wrong to take the drug. You'd only be doing what a husband is supposed to do for his wife. No one could blame you for loving her so much that you'd steal to save her. In fact, people would probably wonder if you didn't love her enough to steal the drug. You'd never be able to look any of us in the face again if you just let her die.

3. CON: Look, maybe it seems like you need the drug more than the druggist does. But don't try to get it by theft. If you steal, you'll be thought of as a criminal in this town for the rest of your life. Could you live with that? At any rate, you shouldn't feel so desperate. We all know how hard you've tried. You've done all you legally can to get that drug. What more could anyone ask of you?

4. PRO: The prospect of breaking the law isn't pleasant, I know, but you ought to steal the drug. She's your wife, and I'm sure your sense of honor would oblige you to help her. It would be your responsibility if she died. You'd never be able to forgive yourself if you failed in your duty to help her. It's your obligation to help her and nobody else's. If the thought of stealing still bothers you, maybe you could pay the druggist back later after you get the money.

4. CON: You shouldn't steal the drug. I can understand your feeling of desperation, but stealing the drug would be wrong no matter how you felt. It's simply a matter of law. Even though the druggist is wrong to try to charge you so much, the drug is his invention and he still has a right to it. You'd be violating that right if you tried to steal it.

5. PRO: This is certainly a difficult decision, but I think you ought to steal the drug. To save your wife you'll have to commit a crime, there's no way out of that. You're a victim of circumstances. But better to steal the drug than to risk letting her die. You might remember that the law can't be set up to cover every possible case, but I'm sure that's small consolation. Under the circumstances, the reasonable thing to do is take the drug, since it's the only hope of saving your wife.

5. CON: I don't think you should steal the drug. I can understand how strongly you must want it, since your wife is desperately ill. I'm sure you would feel justified in your own mind if you were to take the drug. But even at that, neither you nor anyone else is right to take the law into his own hands. Our laws against stealing are designed to protect the rights of all. No matter how good your intentions are, the end doesn't justify the means.

6. PRO: I think the situation is clear. Under the circumstances, you ought to steal the drug. In fact, you're right to steal it. Even though the law says it's wrong to steal, that is irrelevant when a human life is at stake. It would certainly be wrong to let someone die because the law forbids stealing. Ultimately you know what's right; the problem is to do it.

6. CON: Don't steal the drug. I know how badly your wife needs it, but her life may not be the only one at stake. You ought to remember that others may need the drug as much as your wife does, and their lives count for as much as hers. If you steal the drug you guarantee that no one else has a chance at it. Consider the value of all the lives involved, not just your own feelings for your wife, and leave the drug where it is.

SITUATION IV

The drug didn't work, and there was no other treatment known to medicine that could save Heinz's wife. The doctor knew that she had only about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but so weak that she could not tolerate a good dose of pain-killer. The dose it took to ease her pain would only make her die sooner. At times she babbled insanely because of the pain. In her clear-headed moments she asked the doctor for enough morphine to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and she was going to die in a few months anyway. The doctor found himself perplexed, and turned to his colleagues in the hospital for advice. He couldn't decide whether or not to give her the morphine.

1. PRO: You should give her the morphine. From what I understand, the Chief of Medicine here has told you that he thinks it would be all right, and if he thinks it's the right thing to do then I don't see why you'd hesitate. After all, you'll be relieving her suffering. It's the proper thing to do. On the other hand, if you don't give her the morphine the Chief might start to wonder why. I wouldn't take a chance on getting him roused up. There might be trouble.

1. CON: You shouldn't give her the morphine. It just wouldn't be the proper thing to do. She ought to die a natural death. I hear the Chief of Medicine has told you he thinks it would be wrong to give her the drug, and if he thinks it's wrong then I don't see why you're still considering it. But that's not all. They could charge you with murder and execute you. If you give her the morphine you're just asking for trouble.

2. PRO: It would be all right to give her the morphine. She asked you for it, so you'd only be doing what she wants. Who knows? If you do this for her it might pay off for you. And she does have a right to do what she wants with her life. Who would she be hurting but herself? The problem is that it's illegal. But if you're careful, the police won't find out, and then what difference would the law make?

2. CON: It would be stupid to give her the morphine. If there were no law against it, that would be something else. In that case you'd only be doing what she asked, and it would be all right. But there's a law against murder, and they're liable to get you on it. I wouldn't risk my neck, seeing that she's going to die anyway. You have to look out for yourself. In cases like this, nobody can say what's right or wrong. It's all a matter of what you can get away with, and you're not going to get away with this one, I'd bet.

3. PRO: I think you ought to give her the drug. You're obviously feeling a lot of concern about the pain this woman is undergoing. If you care about her pain, that's a good reason to give her the morphine. It's not as though you were giving her the drug because you thought there was something in it for you. No one can blame you for wanting to help her. Furthermore, the woman is suffering right now, and a doctor isn't supposed to let his patients suffer. So you ought to give her the morphine. I think most of the doctors here would agree that it was the right thing to do.

3. CON: I don't think you should give her the drug. You may feel that you've got nothing to lose since she's going to die anyway. But remember that doctors are supposed to preserve life, not end it. What you've got to lose is the admiration of the community. Your reputation would be impaired. How could you hold your head up knowing what people were thinking about you? They might even regard you as a murderer. It's up to you, of course, but I'd say there isn't another doctor on the staff here who would think you were right to give her the morphine.

4. PRO: You really ought to give her the morphine. She asked for it, and in our society everyone has a right to decide about his own life. And you're a doctor. That's pertinent too. It's your duty to relieve her suffering. If you don't, Heinz might try it himself, and he'd have no business interfering in medical affairs. The point's not whether he actually will or not, but that it's your responsibility to see that the woman is comfortable. You're the doctor. If you don't take care of her, and if something happens, you'll have only yourself to blame.

4. CON: You shouldn't give her the morphine because it would be wrong to kill her. I know you're feeling a lot of pity for the woman, so no one could blame you for wanting to put her out of her misery. But that doesn't change the fact that it's wrong to kill another person. We would have chaos if everyone felt free to kill others for any reason that seemed good to him. Laws against murder prevent that chaos. So, even though you're a doctor, you have no right to say who should live or die, and you have no right to say what is or isn't a good reason to kill. Only the law can say those things, and you're duty bound to obey the law.

5. PRO: You'd be justified in giving her the morphine, even though it's wrong from the view of society. So far as society is concerned, the fact that you're saving her from pain is irrelevant; according to the law, it's wrong to kill her, no matter how good your intentions. But do you think you could justify it to yourself if you knew that you were just causing her greater pain the longer you let her live? I don't think so. Compassion demands that you not let her suffer needlessly. And you are the only person in a position to help her. It's only reasonable that you give her the drug.

5. CON: I don't think you'd be wise to give her the morphine. Somehow you have to weigh the suffering of this woman against the good you can do for the entire community. Here's what I mean. When you're a doctor you accept an obligation to preserve life. If your patients think you respect that obligation, they'll permit you to treat them and they'll follow your advice because they trust you. If they don't think so, you might as well not be in practice. And once you take a life deliberately, they think you've betrayed their trust. Your usefulness to the community is through. It's a hard choice, but it would be reasonable to maintain the trust of your patients for their own welfare. Unfortunately, that means this woman must suffer longer.

6. PRO: You'd be right to give her the drug. She's asked you to give it to her, and she has a right to do whatever she wants with her life. Her right to autonomy is inalienable. She can't give up her autonomy to anyone, and any law that tried to take it from her would be invalid. Human life without the hope of autonomy is barely human, and hardly worth preserving. This woman still has one decision left, although she has nothing left to hope for but death. She can live and suffer or she can die. It sounds to me like she's made her decision. She wants to die. If you don't kill her, you'll be preserving her life but denying her autonomy. In that state, her life isn't worth preserving.

6. CON: Giving her the morphine would be wrong because it's wrong to take a human life. I know that some people would say her life isn't worth preserving if she's in so much pain and going to die soon anyway. But if you say that, you're saying that the value of human life can change with the circumstances. That's how people can say that they treasure life, but that killing in war and capital punishment are right. And that's what gets you into the bind of asking, "If it's OK to kill this woman when she's got six months left, then is it still right when she's got eight months or two years?" But if you really respect the value of life, you don't get caught on where to draw the line. Because the value of life is unqualified, it's just wrong to kill a human being. Period.

THE CLARKE-BARTO INCIDENT

Suppose that LeMoyen High School is strict in enforcing the rule against students smoking in washrooms. The following incident takes place:

Mr. Arthur Clarke, a social-studies teacher at LeMoyen, is taking his mid-morning coffee break. On entering a men's washroom he discovers Johnny Barto, a junior, and a somewhat notorious character around the school, smoking. Mr. Clarke knows that Johnny should be in class this hour and furthermore, that he is a troublemaker, is having difficulty with his courses, is on probation, and that he is old enough to quit school. Although he would rather go back to his coffee, Mr. Clarke decides that he ought to say something.

1. Personally I don't care if you smoke or not, John. That's your business. If it were up to me, I'd say to do what you want. But I don't make the rules around here, I just enforce them. And there's a rule against smoking in here. So let's go to the office.

2. If you smoke you're not hurting me, John. It's your body. But if you smoke in the washroom here you're taking a chance. With your record, you can be kicked out of school for breaking the rules. I've said I don't care. If I don't see you, there's nothing I can do to you, right? But if I do, then you go to the office, right? Well, it looks like you go to the office.

3. Personally, I don't respect a kid who breaks school rules. Students aren't supposed to smoke in the washroom. Most of the kids here manage to get through the day without trying to catch a smoke in school. Even those who smoke generally manage. Why can't you? You're certainly not improving your reputation this way. Another suspension won't help much either. Let's go.

4. John, the rules have a purpose. I'm not just preaching to you because I like to hear myself. Without rules, this place would be chaos and you wouldn't like it any better than I would. And no one has a right to break the rules whenever he feels like it. You know you're not supposed to be smoking in here. Let's go to the office.

5. No one can make you obey the rules, John. Only you can decide whether you're going to or not. But you don't have to come to school any more; you're here by choice. If you're going to be part of the student body then you ought to go along with the rules. Just your presence here is like an agreement that you'll abide by the rules, even if you don't find them convenient. If you can't do that then you really ought to quit school. On the way to the office you might think seriously about that.